3/2005

NATO Ground Based Air Defense Interoperability,

“A Positive Step Forward”

Technology revolution, reductions in national defense budgets, and integrated force structure, coupled with the expansion of NATO to 26 nations from the original 16 is directly shaping the future of NATO Low Level Ground Based Air Defense (LLGBAD).  NATO Land Group 5 on Army Air Defense was established as one of the original NATO Army Armament Groups (NAAG) subordinate subgroups.  For over 20 years the Land Group addressed Army Ground Based Air Defense (GBAD) equipment development, training and doctrine issues.  With the end of the Cold War and the implementation of the “Peace Dividend” by nations of the Alliance, national Army and Air Force GBAD forces were integrated.  This evolving change was recognized in NATO by redesignating and refocusing Land Group 5 to address LLGBAD.  The term “Low Level” was selected to differentiate the Group from the longer range and higher altitude air defense systems, such as Patriot that is generally operated by national Air Forces, except in the US.  The placement of Land Group 5 within the NATO organizational structure is shown in Figure 1.

Currently the primary focus of the Land Group is interoperability. This has been interpreted as meaning the ability to link national VSHORAD, SHORAD and MSAM[1] systems to effect integrated engagement operations.[2]  The key to this activity is the establishment of digital data and voice links between the sensors, designated Command and Control Center and the firing element.

The following interoperability demonstrations have been conducted by the Land Group over the past five years.  During the course of each demonstration various lessons were learned, some of which are shown below.  It must be noted key ground rules were established at the beginning that have proved effective as the Land Group has gained experience and knowledge in the conduct of such demonstrations.  Some of the most important ground rules are:                    

·        Each participating nation pays its own way, to include its national industry if they are involved 

·        Limit the number of Participants to three or four to limit technical complexity.

·        Maximize the use of fielded national tactical air defense equipment.  Limit the employment of special unique equipment.

In conducting the interoperability demonstrations, the Land Group compiled a number of Lessons Learned, which included the following:

·        Planning:

o       Identify the national Host and Participants early, approximately two years prior to the planned demonstration date.

o       Initiate face-to-face planning and coordination with the Participants at least 12 to 15 months prior to the demonstration date.

o       Identify three to five clearly defined and focused demonstration objectives that build on each other in complexity.

o       Involve national industry (hardware and software experts) early in the planning process, and retain their expertise to completion of the demonstration.

o       Identify demonstration technical risks early and develop a risk mitigation plan for each.

·        Coordination:

o       Frequent coordination (face-to-face, e-mail, fax, telephone) is required to address issues and resolve problems.

o       Bilateral technical coordination meeting may be required to resolve hardware and/or software interface issues.

·        Execution:

o       Link the demonstrations, if possible, to planned NATO or national exercises.

o       Conduct a “Dress Rehearsal” just prior to the demonstration with actual equipment to identify last minute technical issues and reduce surprises.

o       The Participants must have the knowledge, experience and decision making authority to make minor hardware and software modifications on site to resolve multinational equipment interface issues that may arise at the last minute

As of June 2005 the Land Group had sponsored three interoperability demonstrations.  Two were hosted by Norway (Figure 2) and the last was hosted by Italy (Figure 3).  During each operation Soldiers and Airmen from the participating nations established integrated, interoperable low level air defense capability under the command of the host nation.  Sensor data was correlated and sent to each firing element digitally or by voice for those Participants who did not have digital communications systems. Target allocation and engagement commands were transmitted in a similar manner.

Two new Land Group 5 interoperability demonstrations are currently in their initial planning stages.  One involves the establishment of a synthetic environment whereby the Participants connect to a centralize command and control facility using their tactical air defense equipment, or from national computerized Battle Labs, running system simulation software.  The second future demonstration is being planned for a major national training area where the LLGBAD units can conduct tactical maneuvers.  This exercise is planned to conclude with a live fire demonstration by the Soldiers and Airmen.

In addition to the planning and conduct of interoperability demonstrations, the Land Group, during its semi-annual meetings, has been addressing a number of LLGBAD issues and concerns such as the following:

·      The ability of SHORAD system to engage aerial targets beyond visual range.  The study identified minimum system architectures required to conduct such types of operations.

·      Development of a GBAD Interoperability report.  The reference document discussed GBAD terminology, messaging, the air defense C4I catalogue, and interoperability demonstration results.

·      The paper on Cruise Missile and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle defense was updated.  This area continues to be of concern as the proliferation of such types of aerial vehicles continues unabated.

·      Land Group 5 is also deeply involved in the LLGBAD systems and technology in the Defense Against Terrorism.  It is clear the LLGBAD systems can play a positive role in countering terrorist type activities.

·      The Land Group is now actively engaged in determining how LLGBAD systems can contribute to the defense against Rockets, Artillery and Mortars (RAM) attacks.

This has been a quick summary of where the Land Group has been and what it is doing today.  Of interest and concern is what the future holds for NATO LLGBAD.  Today there is increased emphasis on Joint operations.  This is especially true with several of the nations within the Alliance.  This fact has not been lost on NATO, and it has a direct impact on the mission and functions of the Land Group.  Today discussions are taking place within the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) on how to restructure the organization to enhance jointness, and become capabilities based.  For those who have been associated with NATO for a number of years, this will be a revolutionary change, one that will impact almost every NATO Agency and organization associated with armaments cooperation and development.  In turn, the members of the Alliance will have to analyze the impact of this changes on their national policies and defense strategies.

The first question to be addressed is, “will Land Group 5 on LLGBAD survive as it is currently structured?”  Looking into the “Crystal Ball” the answer appears to be No.  If one were to take “Jointness” to its logical conclusion; all air defense, ground based (system independent), aircraft, naval and Ballistic Missile Defense would be grouped into a single entity.  With regard to the make-up of the resulting Group, one would expect the Air Force to be the dominate partner.  Should this be the case, Army air defense issues would be reduced in importance.  However, if Jointness were to be viewed as jointness within an Army force structure, a situation might exist whereby NATO created a “Fire Support” Group that combined LLGBAD and Field Artillery.  The primary Group would address both issues with the potential for the establishment of subgroups to address the specific issues associated with LLGBAD and Field Artillery.  Of course the third alternative is the potential to eliminate air defense as an area of interest within the CNAD, while concentrating on ballistic missile defense.

The second question to be asked concerns “Capability”.  Does NATO have a Capability Gap within the air defense mission area?  Here the response is not so much a “yes” or “no”, but the perspective from where one views the issue.  A nation within the Alliance may not have an adequate organic air defense capability.  But within the total Alliance the contribution of one or more nation’s air defense assets may result in a very robust NATO air defense capability that can be deployed in support of NATO coalition operations.

As this article is being published elements of the NAAG are actively addressing these questions and trying to come to a harmonized conclusion.    Today the outcome cannot be clearly defined, except for the fact there will be change and it will be revolutionary in nature in lieu of evolutionary.  The “Crystal Ball” will become much clearer by the summer of 2006.

Dr. Alan L. Moore, Jr.

Chairman, NATO Land Group 5 on LLGBAD